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INDUSTRIAL AND LABOR RELATION 
Statement of Julius (Jack) Getman Professor of Law Univ of Texas 
I appreciate the opportunity to meet with the 
Commission. I have been studying the organizing process since 
the early 70's when I participated in a major field study of NLRB 
representation elections.1 During the 8 0's I did further field 
work on organizing. I conducted extensive interviews with union 
organizers, and I attended a two-day management program advising 
companies on how to stay non-union. From 1986 to 1988 I was 
President of the American Association of University Professors. 
The most important question in U.S. labor relations today is 
why private sector unions represent so small a proportion of the 
work force. It was once widely assumed that collective bargaining 
between unions and employers would be the dominant mode for 
establishing wages and working conditions in the private sector. 
Today the percentage of private sector employees represented by 
unions is small and steadily decreasing. This situation cannot be 
attributed to the failures of the bargaining process. Where 
collective bargaining has been employed, it has improved the 
wages and working conditions of employees and made impressive 
positive contributions to our society. 
Some of the decline of the union movement is attributable 
to factors, such as the changing nature of the economy and the 
loss of industrial base, that are only tangentially related to 
the law. In addition, unions bear some of the responsibility for 
their lack of organizing success. During their more successful 
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period, they spent too little money on organizing and routinely 
assigned their least effective staff people to the task. 
Management, on the other hand, was prepared to spend a great deal 
of money, to move facilities, to meet union wage scales in non-
union facilities, to hire lawyers; and consultants, to run anti-
union campaigns in the effort to defeat unionization. The 
management effort has been quite successful. Of course, it has 
been made easier than it should have been by current legal 
doctrines that increase the natural advantage that accrues to 
employers seeking to avoid unionization. I will suggest a few 
changes in the law that I believe would further the goal of a 
truly free choice by employees. 
1. Unions should be given freer access to employees and 
v. 
•t-hp_riqht to respond to employer speeches and meetings. 
In the mid 1950's the Supreme Court in NLRB v United 
Steelworker held that employers can make captive audience 
speeches, opposing unionization, to their employees without 
granting the union a right to respond. It also held in NLRB v 
Babcock & Wilcox Co. that an employer has the right to "post his 
property against nonemployee distribution of union literature," 
without demonstrating that such a prohibition was necessary for 
business reasons. While in each case the Court suggested that the 
Board might come to a different conclusion where it felt that a 
serious imbalance in organizing opportunity was created, the 
Court did not suggest how the Board was to measure whether an 
appropriate balance existed. The Board generally responded by 
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assuming that no imbalance exists whenever the union has some 
ability to reach employees by telephone, mail or meetings.2 When 
the Board has attempted a more careful analysis of union 
organizing opportunities, its approach has been rejected by the 
courts. Together court and Board decisions have established a 
policy favoring property rights over the ability of employees to 
become informed about the arguments favoring unionization. 
During the pre-election campaign, employers and their 
outside consultants have the ability to call the employees 
together, during what would normally be working time, and state 
the case against unions. They can also engage in one-on-one 
meetings with employees during the work day. The union, by 
contrast, is limited to voluntary meetings away from the job site 
and solicitation by employees during non-working times. It is 
only in the rarest circumstances that unions are permitted to 
respond to captive audience speeches or that union organizers are 
granted even limited right of access to the employer's premises. 
However, the assumption of rough equality of organizational 
opportunity on which the law purports to rest is factually 
incorrect. The study of organizing campaigns that I conducted 
together with Professors Goldberg and Brett revealed that the 
current system gives employers a definite advantage in getting 
their message to the employees during a formal campaign. 
Employers have an even greater superiority of access prior to the 
formal campaign. And this imbalance is being increasingly 
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exploited by employers who follow the advice of management 
consultants. 
The current system makes it easy for an employer to run a 
campaign against the individual union organizers. These campaigns 
are quite common, and they respond to real employee concerns. 
Even employees favorable to unionization are frequently troubled 
by the picture of the particular organizer and union when it is 
exclusively drawn by the employer. The personality and dedication 
of organizers is always a matter of concern to employees trying 
to decide upon unionization. At present, the organizer can only 
overcome this tactic with respect to those employees willing to 
come to a meeting or meet with the organizer off the premises and 
not during working hours. 
Representation campaigns would more likely reflect true 
employee choice if unions had a right to respond to employer 
speeches and meetings, and if union organizers had access to the 
employees subject to reasonable labor board regulation. Such a 
system would also have the advantage of demonstrating to 
employees the law's ability to change the employer's absolute 
control over their jobs and working conditions. 
2. Remedies intended to punish and deter illegal behavior should 
be permitted under the NLRA. 
Under current law remedies imposed by the Board for unfair 
labor practices must be for the sole purpose of undoing the 
effect of specific illegal actions. This means that access 
remedies are almost never granted and that the penalty for 
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discriminatory discharges is generally limited to reinstatement 
and backpay, a cost that many employers are willing to pay for 
the benefits that they think likely to flow from increasing 
employee fear of unionization. Studies suggest that reinstated 
workers rarely return for any length of time to the jobs from 
which they were discharged. 
In deciding whether to issue a bargaining order under 
current law, the Board must determine "the possibility of erasing 
the effects of past practices and of ensuring a fair 
election...by the use of traditional remedies..." This standard 
forces the Board to make uninformed judgments about the likely 
impact of unfair labor practices, and of the effectiveness of 
remedies, on voter behavior. It is not surprising that Board 
bargaining order decisions inevitably reflect efforts to punish 
and deter. In part this is because the Board's "traditional" 
remedies are so weak that they are most unlikely to deter 
campaign violations or encourage obedience to the law. However, 
given the reviewing standard that limits the Board to undoing the 
impact of unlawful behavior in particular cases, and the fact 
that bargaining orders may serve to override rather than to 
protect free choice, it is not surprising that reviewing Courts 
frequently set aside Board bargaining orders. 
It would better serve the policies of the Act if the Board 
could impose remedies designed to punish employers who 
intentionally commit what are legislatively determined to be 
serious unfair labor practices such as discriminatory discharges 
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or bargaining with a view to eliminating a union. If a system of 
treble damages, injunctions, and loss on government contracts 
were developed, adherence to the law would likely be given a far 
higher priority by employers than it currently is. Where 
employers bargain with a view to not reaching agreement but to 
rid themselves of a union, the Board should be able to impose a 
settlement that will include the imposition of an agreement. 
3. Employers should not be permitted to permanently replace 
striking workers. 
Since 1937 when the Mackay decision was issued, its 
application has permitted the devastation of unions, communities, 
families, and individuals simply because employees exercise 
rights supposedly protected by the National Labor Relations Act. 
The Mackay doctrine has been defended on the grounds that the 
right to permanently replace is somehow necessary to permit 
employers to withstand strikes. The metaphor of the "level 
playing field" has frequently been employed in its support. 
Scholarly investigation, including my own study of the paper 
industry, disputes this conclusion. Temporary replacement 
workers, supervisors, and newly hired workers who are not 
replacements will generally be available to permit an employer to 
operate during a strike. 
The consequences of Mackay for the organizing process are 
significant. In every hard-fought election, employers make a 
variant of the following argument: "Under the law I am required 
to bargain with the union and I will do that, but I can and will 
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bargain hard. I am not required to make any concessions or agree 
to any terms that I do not think are in the Company's best 
interests. The only way the union can try to force me is by 
pulling you out on strike. If you go on strike to force me to 
accept unrealistic union demands, I have the right to permanently 
replace you, and I will not hesitate to exercise this right." 
Such an argument is perfectly legal. Its common use, together 
with employee knowledge of recent strikes in which other 
employees were permanently replaced, helps to account for the 
fact, that employees regularly perceive threats of reprisal in 
hard-fought election campaigns that do not violate the law. In 
fact in such cases employers are in fact legally threatening 
employees with job loss if they vote for representation. Mackav 
may also affect the campaign dynamic because employees fear to be 
placed in a situation in which they will have to choose between 
loyalty to fellow employees and preserving their jobs. 
5. Faculty members in private sector colleges and universities 
should have the right to choose unionization. 
In the Yeshiva case the Supreme Court concluded that faculty 
in "mature" colleges and universities are managers under the Act 
who do not need the right of free choice with regard to 
unionization because their interests and those of the 
administration are the same. Since that decision, the great 
majority of faculty at private universities have been denied the 
right to choose representation. The conclusion that faculty are 
managers at any university with a committee structure of any 
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significance reflects a monumental misunderstanding of the 
conditions of faculty employment at many institutions of higher 
education. During my period as President of the American 
Association of University Professors, I had the opportunity to 
visit a variety of campuses around the country. The reality of 
academic life in many places bore little resemblance to the ideal 
picture drawn by the Court in its Yeshiva decision. 
The Yeshiva decision has the remarkable effect of declaring 
all faculty in most institutions to be "managers" because of the 
administrative role of a few. If this approach were applied to 
other sectors of the economy, it would deny representation rights 
to many employees and provide employers with a simple technique 
for avoiding unionization. The Yeshiva decision endangers labor 
management cooperative programs that adopt committee structures 
similar to those common in academic institutions. Unions that 
favor such program might be bargaining their members out of the 
Acts protection. 
6. Binding arbitration should be available where impasse is 
reached during first contract negotiations. 
It is a sensible policy to keep the government's role in 
collective bargaining limited. However, this policy judgement has 
led the Board and courts to give an unnecessarily limited scope 
to the duty to bargain. After a successful organizing campaign, 
employers are too often able to use the bargaining process to 
avoid agreement and eliminate the union. A well counseled 
employer can usually bargain in this way without being found 
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guilty of violating the Act. Even if a refusal to bargain is 
found, no effective remedy is imposed. We have learned from the 
public sector that using some form of arbitration to resolve 
disputes in such situations does not interfere with the 
bargaining process to the extent previously assumed. The risks to 
free collective bargaining; from surface bargaining are greater 
than the risks from alternate dispute resolution techniques such 
as binding arbitration or more effective Board remedies. 
The current system distorts free choice in two ways. Some 
employees who formally choose representations are denied true 
collective bargaining; other employees may decide that voting for 
representation or otherwise supporting a union will be a futile 
act that may cause the employee trouble but is unlikely to lead 
to positive results. An employee, otherwise favorable to unions, 
with a realistic understanding of the risks posed by current law, 
could well decide to vote no in a representation election. If an 
effective alternative such as first contract arbitration were an 
option, employers would be more likely to bargain in good faith 
so that collective bargaining would work without government 
involvement, and unions would do far better in representation 
elections. 
7. The election process should be speeded up. 
Shortening the time between petition and election could 
substantially reduce the advantage that the formal campaign gives 
to employers. Under current law an employer can often delay the 
holding of an election by raising questions about unit 
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determination and voting eligibility. Delay works against 
representation in the great majority of cases. Since both parties 
know this, employers have an advantage in negotiating election 
issues prior to the vote. It would be a useful change to require 
the Board to develop expedited procedures under which quick 
elections are routinely held and technical questions of 
eligibility and unit determined afterwards. 
1.Julius Getman, Stephen B. Goldberg, and Jeanne Herman Union 
Representation Elections: Law and Reality, (1976) 
2. The Board has also apparently assumed that appropriate balance 
of opportunity was assured by its Excelsior rule requiring 
employers to make available lists of names and addresses of 
eligible voters prior to the election. 
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